Boko Haram - The Aftermath

The Boko Haram Mayhem that occured in the Northern part of Nigeria late July and early August this year, surely exposed the inadequacies and complacency of the Nigerian Security Services.

Boko Haram, an Islamic sect which is radically opposed to western education and proposes Sharia (Islamic Law) throughout the length and breadth of Nigeria, brought the North Eastern part of Nigeria to a complete standstill.

The violence started in Bauchi, capital of Bauchi State, where the sect overran the local Police Headquarters with just bows and arrows, swords, sticks and petrol bombs. (This in itself is quite hard to believe taking into consideration the Police were supposedly armed with better and more sophisticated weapons). Apparently the attack happened late in the night around 10pm and caught the Police unaware. The aftermath left 154 people dead, the Police Headquarters in ruin and 11 operational and private vehicles completely destroyed.

The Nigerian Police never recovered from this surprise attack. The sect regrouped and simultaneously attacked Police formations and Government facilities in Borno, Kano and Yobe States. Leaving trails of mayhem, death and unwanton destruction. The Federal Government was left with no choice other than to invite the Nigerian Army to try and contain the rampaging sect members. The Army quickly identified the main stronghold of the sect and pulverized the main enclave and headquarters of the sect with mortar and heavy artillery gun shells. One would think they were at war with an advancing enemy with the heavy bombardment that was unleashed. They left nothing to chance. They reduced the main compound of the enclave to rubble. No one was allowed to come out alive.

It later emerged that the Security Services had fore-knowledge of the impending attack by the sect but their warnings were ignored by the state government so as not to destabilise the fragile Islamic establishment which most of the state governors courted for their political survival especially in terms of the imposition of Sharia.

The Director General of the State Security Services (SSS), Afakriya Gadazama, absolved his Agency of any complacency and admitted to the House of Representatives Committee on National Security and Police Affairs that indeed the Agency had been keeping surveillance on the sect and made reports to the appropriate quarters but this was ignored. He further went on to say, his Agency had on a regular basis always forewarned the government on impending security threats or sectarian violence but this warnings were always not treated seriously.

In fact, the Agency claimed that between the 14th and 17th of July, just a week and a half before the mayhem, it sent out 17 security reports on the recent activities of the sect across the country intimating the authorities of the strong likelihood of violence. This apparently was also ignored.

The Director of Defence Information, Colonel Mohammed Terima also absolved the Military Intelligence Agencies of any blame. He said the sect had been in existence as far back as 1995 under different names such as Ahlulsunna wal’jama’ah hijra. He said the Security Agencies had over this period been monitoring and containing their activities.

For instance, he said on the 13th November 2008, the group’s leader, Mohammed Yusuf and a number of his followers were arrested by security operatives and handed over to the Inspector-General of Police for prosecution. They were charged to court but subsequently granted bail by an Abuja high court on the 20th January 2009. The Judge saw no reason in remanding the accussed persons in Prison even with the avalanche of security reports before him. They were eventually discharged for want of evidence.

To date, It is only the Nigerian Police that hasn't or didn’t come forward to defend itself on their handling of the mayhem. So who really was to blame for the loss of over 800 lives? Each of the Security Agencies has absolved itself of any wrong doing except the Police. So, who or whom did the State Security Services send its intelligence reports to? The State Security Service reports directly to the National Security Adviser in the Presidency. Was it the Presidency or the State Governors concerned?

Why were the intelligence reports and warnings ignored? Why was the sect able to easily overrun Police Formations across the four states they targeted even though the Police had prior knowledge of their suspicious movements? Why was there a failure of Intelligence? What happened to the newly created Counter Terrorist Squad of the Nigerian Police, trained by the Counter Terrorist Unit of The Metropolitan Police and Israel CTS, a Private Israeli Counter Terrorist Training Firm? After the millions of Naira expended in creating and training this squad, why were they operationally inadequate, to contain the threat?

Unfortunately, answers to these questions may never be known. The opportunity to at least unravel some of the myths surrounding the sect was lost when the leader of the sect, a self-proclaimed Islamic scholar, Mohammed Yusuf was inadvertently killed in detention after arrest. The authorities lost the chance to unravel his source of financing and sponsorship. Some sections of the local press felt he was killed extra judiciously to protect some of his very powerful backers.

Right across the world, Internal and Homeland Security is always priority and taken very seriously. It borders on the corporate existence of every nation. Nigeria’s case should not be an exception. I hope lessons have been learnt.

The Threat We Face - The Dreaded AK 47

The Threat to life and property is a major downside in the everyday life of every Nigerian. The streets are unsafe at night and most households sleep with one eye open. You could be living in the highbrow neighbourhoods of Ikoyi or the Slums of Ajegunle in the city of Lagos, but you are still susceptible to the caprices of the terrors of the night. The scourge of Armed Robbery transcends the whole country. Businesses are not safe either. The onslaught on banking institutions at a time, became an everyday affair. The Nigerian Police were overwhelmed. Each time, they were subdued by the superiority of the weaponry carried by the Armed Robbers. This weapon is the dreaded AK 47.

When Mikhail Kalashnikov developed this rifle during the Second World War, he was looking for a rifle that was simple in design, compact in size but awesome in power, highly rugged and inexpensive to manufacture. The AK 47 was not built for accuracy but pure devastation, maximum devastation. What is most worrying is the easy availability of this rifle to criminal gangs in Nigeria

The aim of this write-up is not to inculcate fear or promote the efficacy of the AK 47 but to illustrate the threat posed by the easy availability of this devastating rifle so that people including security vendors and practitioners are sufficiently briefed so that when they are proposing or developing security solutions, critical thought would be given to this level of threat and the right and proper solution proposed.

A SHORT HISTORY OF THE AK 47

The first Kalashnikov assault rifle was invented by Mikhail Timofeyevich Kalashnikov whilst recovering from injuries sustained during fighting in the Second World War. Its first incarnation was the AK-47, named to coincide with the year of its entry into active service (1947) . Whilst production of the original AK-47 largely ceased in the mid 1950s, modern variants continue to be produced in many parts of the world. It is estimated that there are somewhere between 50 and 70 million Kalashnikov assault Rifles spread across the world’s five continents.

The Kalashnikov remains the preferred weapon for many armed forces, rebel groups and armed gangs because of its proven reliability and widespread availability. The AK-47 in particular is robust and simple to operate, with only minimal working parts. The Rifle is produced in tens of millions around the world. During the Cold War, the former Soviet Union also supplied millions to various regimes they were supporting around the world, making them cheap and obtainable from numerous sources. The production and supply of its ammunition (7.62 x 39 mm) is equally prolific, with hundreds of millions stock piled in many countries.

The AK 47 is a semi-automatic military assault rifle. In untrained hands it could be a dangerous weapon. It can be fired in single shot mode or can be set for automatic fire by the simple operation of a lever located near the trigger mechanism. In automatic mode, the AK-47 can be fired at a rate of 600 rounds per minute as long as the trigger remains depressed, although its magazine can only store 30 rounds, which will empty in a little over 3 seconds. The weapon has a maximum range of 800 to 1,000 meters, but is only really guaranteed to be accurate when used by a trained marksman up to a range of about 400 to 600 meters. At excessive ranges (over 1,000 meters), the rifle can still cause tremendous injuries or death because of the “yawing” effect of its bullets.

In 1959, the AK-47 was upgraded by its original Russian manufacturers to the AKM model, which was lighter and cheaper to produce. In 1974 a new variant was introduced, the AK-74 which was basically a re-chambered AKM variant to take the newer 5.45 x 39 mm calibre ammunition, the Russian equivalent to the standard5.56 x 45 mm NATO standard round . The most modern family of Kalashnikov weapons is the AK-100 series. A variant of the AK47 is presently manufactured in Nigeria by The Defence Industries Corporation, the rifle is called OBJ 006

THE NIGER DELTA

The AK 47 is the most widely used assault rifle in the Niger Delta by the militants. Its availability is buoyed by resources available through illegal oil bunkering which runs into millions of dollars. The Federal Government is at a crossroad as to how to stop or reduce the inflow of illegal arms into the Niger Delta areas. The most the government has been able to do is run programs called guns for cash, where the militants trade in their guns for money. This definitely hasn’t worked, the militants seem to always have the last laugh in that they trade unserviceable rifles for cash and buy more guns with the money they collect from the government.

HUMAN COST

It is estimated that around 250,000 people are killed each year by the AK 47. In Nigeria there isn’t any available data on deaths from the AK47 but most deaths from Armed Robberies are caused by the AK47. The AK 47 is now the standard issue for the Nigeria Police Force and the Military. It has been established earlier that the predominant weapon used in the Niger Delta is the AK 47, so it is safe to attribute most deaths from the conflict to the AK 47.

PROLIFERATION

AK assault rifles are in the inventories of nearly half of the world’s armies, making them by far the world’s most prolific and used assault rifles. At least 82 countries currently list the AK 47 or its variant within their State arsenals. It is also the firearm of choice for virtually every armed group operating from every continent on the globe. Images from criminal organisations or armed groups usually depict Kalashnikov rifles. Global estimates put the production of AK rifles in the region of 50–70 million, although estimates of 100million are not uncommon.

Demand in many parts of the world for Kalashnikov assault rifles remains strong, not least because the price remains relatively low. Unlike the price of other global commodities such as Gold, Copper, Oil and Gas, the price of a Kalashnikov continues to fall in real terms, aiding its proliferation in poverty-stricken regions of the world. The price of an AK-47 derivative varies depending on sale location, quality, and quantity. A brand new Kalashnikov from a Russian factory costs around $240, depending on the derivative and size of the purchase. In Africa an AK-47 can be bought for around $30 in areas where supplies are saturated. Thousands of Jordanian Kalashnikovs bought by the US for the new Iraqi security forces retailed at approximately $60 each. Stockpiled Balkan AK-47 variants cost US and European buyers between $50 and $100 per rifle

CONCLUSION

The easy availability of the AK 47 to criminal gangs in Nigeria poses a very serious threat to the corporate existence of the country. Night life is nearly zero and staying indoors doesn’t fair better. You just never know when the marauders will come calling. I was recently attacked by Armed Robbers in a well guarded gated development in Parkview Estate in Ikoyi Lagos. The armed gang easily overwhelmed the unarmed security guards. They just appeared from nowhere and came to the sitting room where we were watching TV. The AK 47 they carried sure looked menacing. You can imagine the trauma, the invasion of your own home. The other incident was when they came calling at a hotel I put up in around Ikeja. That was also a harrowing experience. The robbers were armed to the teeth with AK 47’s and they sure had a field day. As a matter of fact most major hotels in Lagos have been hit including Eko Le’ Meridian and the very prestigious Sofitel Moorhouse in Ikoyi. At Eko Meridian the Armed Robbers spent over 2 hours moving from room to room. In all cases the police were helpless because of the superiority of the arms the Armed Robbers were carrying. The issue of the ineptitude of the police will be another topic that I will write about in a later blog. The economic structures haven’t been spared either. The Banks have faced the full brunt. No Nigeria Bank has escaped this onslaught. The Banks have had to expend millions in fortifying their vaults and branches. The AK 47 is truly a menace that welds devastating and catastrophic consequences. Its power is so awesome that 50 years later it is still treated with a lot of awe.

The Dreaded Machine: Explicit Demonstration of The AK 47 Against The M 16

BIBLIOGRAPHY
The Inventor, Lieutenant General Mikhail Kalashnikov.
The AK-47, Control Arms Campaign, June 2006
Jane’s Defence Weekly, 15 June 2006
Amnesty International, the International Action Network on Small Arms
Oliver Sprague (Oxfam GB)
Hugh Griffiths (independent research consultant)
Brian Wood (Amnesty International).

Identifying The Security Needs In A Corporate Enviroment

Determining your security needs requires an analytical dissection of your existing framework. This would instigate the development of a robust security structure. In developing this structure a comprehensive methodical analysis with in-depth understanding of the organisational structure has to be initiated. Initial prognosis has to be a fine comb dissembling of existing structures while allowing critical appraisals to determine the initial macro security tasks. It takes a critical approach to structure a concise security plan.

In Nigeria, there is a lackadaisical approach to the concept of prevention. The notion of protecting and preventing imminent threats to critical assets is non-existent. Most security structures are designed or commissioned in response to related incidents. In other words security is only put in place after the incident or threat occurs. So, whatever is developed is done in haste and lacks the analytical approach to mitigate such incidents or breaches from re-occurring.

Very few security structures are products of comprehensive analysis, as most are developed on an ad-hoc basis and lopsided. There is also that mediocre thought that security is not necessary when there is no impending ompromise more so when the cost of implementation seems expensive. So one is left to wonder how people invest so much on physical structures and human resources without any thought of safeguarding these structures and resources which must have cost colossal sums.

The aim of any security analysis is to identify security exposures in a methodical and thorough manner. So that whatever security initiative is contemplated, it will be based on a critical broad analysis and not just simply on the occurrence of the last security breach. The analysis ensures that specific mitigating concepts are directed appropriately at the precise needs.

The goal however, is not to develop a foolproof security plan. The goal instead, is to make the intended breach difficult and not necessarily impossible. The level of difficulty for the breach would depend on the robustness of security put in place, with consideration given to the value of the asset and the organisation's tolerance for risk. The underlying concept is that an asset cannot be protected completely, without absorbing some costs and inhibiting some operational endeavours.

Understanding the Security Analysis

The security analysis process is divided into five phases: Asset Definition; Threat Assessment; Vulnerability Analysis; Security Countermeasures; and Implementation.

Asset Definition
Asset definition begins with a broad understanding of the organisation's operations, its tasks, functions and its operating environment. Often, intangible assets are the most significant and are only discernible by examining the organisation's operations in depth. In effect, this step defines targets for attack.

Threat Assessment
A comprehensive security plan requires a critical identification of the threats. All areas of exposure have to be identified and considered. The assessment will identify all areas that are vulnerable. Threats that are unique to the organisation are identified and processed. Consideration too, has to be given to threats that may not have occurred yet, but are applicable because of the nature of the organisation or business.

Vulnerability Analysis
Security countermeasures represent obstacles in the path of imminent threat. The objective is to make the event less likely to occur by making it very difficult for a would be perpetrator to accomplish his or her deed. Before introducing the obstacles however, the processes must be defined. This exercise highlights points of vulnerability and provides a framework for the selection of various security countermeasures.

Security Countermeasures
Just as a patient may be harmed by improper medication, an organisation's security posture may be weakened, if not compromised, by improper application of security countermeasures. The exercise is more art than science, requiring a collaborative effort of management and security staff to arrive at a program consistent with an organisation's needs. Security countermeasures can include electronic security systems, physical barriers, security personnel, policies and procedures.

Policies state management's position and philosophy on business issues and practices. Procedures define the means for implementing the policy. This is a critical part of a security program. It defines programs and processes that are essential for security mechanisms to be effective.

Implementation
In this phase recommendations are transformed into specifications for people, systems and policies. The objective is to translate the security plan into procedures, organisational programs and processes. Equipment is purchased and deployed. All resulting processes are orchestrated to complement and support each other. In the aftermath a robust indispensable security solution is in place backed by the necessary security initiative.

Are Nigeria Banks Truly Protected From Armed Robbery? The Bullion Van Directive

When Mike Okiro, the Inspector General of Police issued out directives in 2007 that all banks in Nigeria should acquire Armoured Cash in Transit Trucks, a lot of people heaved a sigh of relief. At least they thought this would stem the tide of incessant killings and onslaughts by armed robbers on the banking industry. More people were glad though, that this would reduce the reckless marauding travesty of the rampaging Hilux trucks and Peugeot Station Wagons that regularly harassed innocent road users. Close to 2 years later, not all the banks have complied with this directive. More often than not, you still find this rampaging Hilux trucks parading the streets, probably less menacing now, after very strict instructions from above not to blare their noise making, heralding sirens. For those banks that complied and acquired Armoured CIT trucks, the question is, are these trucks really capable of stopping Armed Robbers in their stride?

Immediately the directive was given, everyone who was anyone that had some bit of money saw the opportunity to make a quick buck and just scampered off to Texas, Stuttgart or Rio buying any Armoured Truck in sight, without a clue as to what was required or needed. They were more focussed on the financial gains and not the provision of the right and proper product. So, we now have a proliferation of Armoured Trucks in different shapes and sizes all over the country, with no guidelines on standardisation or conformity.

The Nigerian society is a very peculiar society that requires peculiar and specific solutions to its problems. What obtains and works on the streets of Europe or America might not necessarily work in Nigeria. The threat levels on the streets of New York or London are quite different to the threat levels on the streets of Lagos or Port Harcourt. You don’t see armed robbers on the streets of London brandishing AK47’s, but on the streets of Lagos that is the norm. And when they attack it is usually as a small army. So you can imagine a band of about 20 men attacking a bank or bullion vehicle fully armed with assault rifles capable of firing 100 rounds per minute. To stand a chance the defences in place must be tailored specifically to withstand this sort of threat.

For Armoured CIT Trucks, the preferred ballistic material used for armouring is ballistic grade steel. The level of protection required would determine the thickness of the armoured panels. As a standard, most American built CIT truck are built to NIJ (National Institute of Justice Ballistic Standard) Level II to IIIA. The maximum threat level for level IIIA is the .44 Magnum. Anything more powerful would penetrate the ballistic steel. Available armouring statistics show that a minimum thickness of between 4-6mm, depending on the type of ballistic steel, is required to withstand the threat from an AK 47. For the bullet resistant glass, the thickness should be a minimum of 45mm. This protection level is the NIJ level IV or the European level B7.

Most American built trucks do not meet this level or standard. For the American market, attaining this level is not necessary because is is not commensurable to the threat level. And the overseas market is not large enough to make it economically viable for the manufacturers to build trucks to this standard. Furthermore this would mean investing in re-tooling and new equipment which would work out to be too expensive.

These shortcomings were quite evident in the number of casualties the Americans have suffered in Iraq. Most of the earlier armoured trucks deployed could not withstand the IED’s and roadside bombs of the insurgents. The armoured trucks were not built for urban CQBs (Closed Quarter Battles). Nowadays Manufactureres don't like using the words bulletproof, bullet resistant seems to be more appropraite. If there was really a vehicle that could be bulletproof, the Americans wouldn’t have suffered such high number of casualties especially with the amount of resources they commit to defense research and technology. The other issue which is of much concern is that, American built Armoured CIT trucks have a lifespan of just 3-4 years. And that is for a society that has very good if not perfect road networks.

In Nigeria where the road networks are deplorable, this would really be a challenge. The added weight of the armouring plus the weight of its cargo usually shortens the lifespan of the truck's suspension, braking, and mechanical systems. With very bad roads, the lifespan could easily be shortened to around 18 months. Usually the first part of an armoured truck that needs replacing is the chassis. In the past, American Armourers or Armoured vehicle fleet owners would remove the body from a worn chassis, refurbish it, and mount it on a new chassis, often as many as three times. Today, Armourers and Fleet owners have found it more economical to refurbish older trucks and sell them on to the burgeoning overseas markets, especially in Africa.

From this, one can easily assume that majority of the American built Armoured Trucks in Nigeria are refurbished and second-hand. In recent times there have been 4 different incidents, where these America built trucks have been attacked and in all the cases, the Armed Robbers succeded in carting away very large sums of money. In one of the incidents they blew up the truck with dynamites, in another one they put a log across the road and demobilised the truck by shooting at the tyres, but the one that struck me most was the incident where they demobilised the truck and used a welding machine to cut open the truck. This was a bit suprising because usually a basic welding machine should not be able to cut through ballistic grade steel easily. This just plainly shows the vulnerability of these trucks.

What now comes to mind is how the manufacturers hope to provide the regular after sales service and maintenance required to keep these trucks on the road. Armoured Trucks and vehicles need regular maintenance and service to check for gaps in the welding or breaks to the joints. With the roads we have in Nigeria this becomes more evident. A brand new car on our roads after a couple of years looks worse for wear, not to talk of a vehicle or truck that has an extra ton of weight added to a chassis that was specifically built to a specific load bearing weight. With this extra weight the chassis would definitely wear out quickly.

Unfortunately in Nigeria there is always the tendency to compromise standards to the detriment of quality and efficiency. A lot of people engaged in the security business as vendors or suppliers have no prerequisite knowledge at all, about practices and service requirements within the security industry and in most cases clients are always eager to embrace and engage these people because they usually offer a cheaper option in prices but the bottom line is, when your security is compromised you stand exposed.